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This dissertation examines the subject of jurisdiction and arbitrability of issues related to 
energy and natural resources in the world, in order to enhance the arbitration institute in 
Brazil. The study is based on a recent case pending in Brazilian courts, named “Lula case”, 
which refer to a dispute between the State and concessionaires that grant the right to explore 
and produce oil and gas in a determined area. The presence of arbitration clauses in the 
concession contracts for exploration and production of oil and gas in Brazil raises questions 
related to the disposability of the rights concerned. It is paramount to set benchmarks on 
arbitral tribunals’ power to decide on these matters and to define to what extent arbitral 
awards may defy public policy, national sovereignty over natural resources and national 
courts’ jurisdiction to render decisions in this regard. Otherwise, the randomness of judicial 
decisions makes the arbitration clause ineffective. Moreover, the Lula case arises substantive 
issues related to the necessity to protect investors in the oil and gas industry, since acts 
arguably connect to the State policy power may cause damages to the private parties. The 
work critically examines the decision given by national courts so far and proposes an 
international approach to face situations involving the State and the necessity to protect 
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Brazilian Arbitration Act1 (BAA) was enacted over 20 years ago. National courts 
were initially reluctant to apply it, because of arguments from part of the legal community2 
that it was unconstitutional, by allowing parties to waive the inalienable right to seek justice 
in the courts, protected by the Federal Constitution. This controversy existed until the Federal 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of key articles of the law in 2001, under the 
argument that although a law may not prevent parties from accessing the judiciary, parties 
can contractually waive this right in matters involving disposable pecuniary rights3.  
In 2002, Brazil ratified the New York Convention4 (NYC) and the procedure for 
recognizing and enforcing awards has subsequently been expedited by a December 2004 
Constitutional amendment that shifted original jurisdiction over recognition of foreign awards 
(judicial and arbitral) from the Federal Supreme Court to the Superior Tribunal of Justice 
(STJ)5, setting the decision free from the uncertainties associated with constitutional law6. 
The BAA reflects the influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Commercial 
Arbitration7 (UNCITRAL Model Law) and of the NYC. The jurisprudential evolution shows 
that gradual advances have been occurring in recent years. National courts have increasingly 
abstained from interfering in the merits of arbitral awards and the STJ has been increasingly 
                                                          
1 Brazilian Law 9,307/96  
2 Marcelo A Muriel, ‘A Arbitragem Frente Ao Judiciário Brasileiro’ (2004) 1 Revista Brasileira de Arbitragem 27, 
28. 
3 Brazilian Federal Supreme Court, sitting en banc, Regimental Appeal in Contested Foreign Judgment no. 
5206, Reporting Justice Sepúlveda Pertence, judged on December 12, 2001, published in the DJ (Court 
Reporter) of April 30, 2004 
4 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958 
entered into force 07 June 1959) 330 UNTS 38 (1968) 
5 The Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ) is the highest court for non-constitutional matters, with responsibility 
for harmonizing interpretation of federal law by the state and regional federal courts of appeal. 
6 Alexis Mourre, ‘Perspectives of International Arbitration in Latin America’ (2006) 17 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 597, 4. 





supporting the recognition of foreign arbitral awards, as well as the validity of arbitration 
clauses 8.  
By following the NYC9, Article 39 of BAA states that a request for the recognition or 
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall be denied in Brazil if the STJ ascertains that: I- 
in accordance with Brazilian law, the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration; II-the decision is offensive to public policy10. 
According to Article 1 of the BAA, persons capable of contracting may settle through 
arbitration disputes related to rights over which they may dispose11. Thus, the STJ may refuse 
enforcement of arbitral awards related to rights that are not disposable under Brazilian law. 
Given that the definition of disposable rights is not expressly stated in Brazilian law, it is 
necessary to define the parameters of what subjects can and cannot be settled by arbitration, 
especially oriented, in this study, to matters related to energy and natural resources. 
 The presence of arbitration clauses in the concession contracts for exploration and 
production of oil and gas in Brazil raises questions related to the disposability of the rights 
concerned. It is paramount to set benchmarks on arbitral tribunals’ power to decide on these 
matters and to define to what extent arbitral awards may defy public policy, national 
sovereignty over natural resources and national courts’ jurisdiction to render decisions in this 
regard. Otherwise, the randomness of judicial decisions, allowing or not the arbitration in 
each case, makes the arbitration clause ineffective. According to Kaplan: 
                                                          
8 Superior Tribunal of Justice. Conflict of Competence no. 139.519 - RJ (2015/0076635-2), Reporting Justice 
Nancy Andrighi, judged on 15 April 2015, published in the DJ (Court Reporter) of April 20, 2015. 
9 According to the art. V(2) NYC, the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may be refused if the 
competent authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:  (a) the subject 
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that country; or (b) the 
recognition or enforcement of the award is contrary to the public policy of that country. 
10 Article 39, BAA 





The reality is that, as far as I know, few of the developing countries who have 
adopted the New York Convention have taken any steps to ensure that they 
have a judiciary capable of ensuring that the treaty obligations they have 
assumed are honoured in practice’ Fortunately, some steps may be taken to 
attempt to improve this situation. Court familiarity with the NYC grows 
naturally with exposure, but seminars and training for the judiciary might help 
improve familiarity in the short term12. 
In order to deepen this study, I analyze a recent case in the Brazilian oil and gas 
industry. The conflict arose from a decision made by the National Petroleum, Natural Gas 
and Biofuels Agency (ANP), contested by the concessionaire. The latter requested arbitration 
under the ICC, as stipulated in the arbitration clause (clause 31.4) of the concession 
agreement13. The ANP filed an action with a federal court in Rio de Janeiro (the Agency’s 
headquarters venue) to stop the arbitration, claiming the subject matter was not arbitrable and 
had to be decided by national courts. The court ruled in favor of the ANP, sent a request to 
the ICC to stop the arbitration and stated its own jurisdiction to decide the dispute14.  
Based on the described case (henceforth the “Lula case”), this study aims to examine 
the legal issues involved, especially those related to determination of jurisdiction and to 
arbitrability of matters concerning energy and natural resources, arguably connected to public 
policy grounds. The work analyzes how arbitral tribunals, national courts and the legal 
community have been treating the issues worldwide. 
                                                          
12 Neil  Kaplan, Speech to the Franco-British Law Society in Paris in 2001 (19(2)Journal of International 
Arbitration 2002) 170 (as cited in Quentin Tannock:, ‘Judging the Effectiveness of Arbitration through the 
Assessment of Compliance with and Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards’ 21 Arbitration 
International  (2005)76). 
13 National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency (ANP), 2nd Bidding Round Concession Agreement 
<http://www.brasilrounds.gov.br/round2/arquivos_r2/Edital/Edital_en.pdf>  accessed 29 July 2015 
14 1st Federal Court of the Judiciary Section of Rio de Janeiro. Ordinary Action no. 0005966-81.2014.4.02.5101, 
Justice Mauro Souza Marques da Costa Braga, judged on 15 May 2015, published in the DJ (Court Reporter) of 





The first and bigger part of this paper goes from chapter 2 to chapter 7 and is 
dedicated to issues of jurisdiction and arbitrability, the main topics already analyzed by 
Brazilian courts in the Lula case. The second chapter explains the Lula case and the issues it 
triggered. The third chapter analyzes the meanings of arbitrability. The fourth chapter 
considers the law applicable to determine arbitrability. The fifth chapter talks about 
jurisdiction to determine arbitrability. The sixth chapter is dedicated to subjects considered 
not arbitrable, especially how questions involving public policy and State sovereignty are 
faced worldwide and in Brazil. The seventh chapter critically analyzes the federal court’s 
decision in the Lula case.  
The second part is about the consequences of considering a State act as a sovereign 
act, under the perspective of the international practice in the oil and gas industry and the 
transnational standards present in lex petrolea. It is important to remember that the judicial 
decision in the Lula case just considered the act ius imperium in order to fix the jurisdiction, 
by saying that, for its nature, the right was not disposable and dispute was not arbitrable15. 
The merits of the pleading, about if the act caused damage to investors and whether or not the 
damages have to be compensated has not been faced yet.  
Thus, the second part of this work will only theoretically consider the concerns related 
to the consequences of sovereign acts, especially when they affect investors or private parties 
in the energy industry, according to international standards. The Lula case raises substantive 
issues that are not new and that have already been faced in international arbitrations 
worldwide. Then, the international approach is studied in broad terms, as guidance to future 
regulatory acts, national court decisions and future arbitrations related to oil and gas in Brazil. 
The ninth chapter concludes.  
                                                          





2. The Lula case. 
 
Petrobras, BG E&P Brasil Ltda and Petrogal Brasil S.A, in a consortium, signed a 
concession agreement to explore and produce oil and gas in the area called Block BM-S-11, 
as a result of the 2nd Brazilian Concessions Bidding Round in 2000 16. 
After the implementation of the minimum work exploration program and carrying out 
the activities contained in the discovery evaluation plan, the consortium submitted to the 
National Petroleum, Natural Gas, and Biofuels Agency (ANP) two development plans for the 
establishment of two oil fields in contiguous areas. The proposal was rejected by the ANP’s 
Board of Directors, which rejected the consortium’s request to separate the field into two 
parts, arguing its uniqueness (the block is hereinafter called “Lula field”)17. 
Considering the failure of the Consortium to achieve the division of the Lula field into 
two oil fields, the Consortium started proceedings to submit the ANP’s decision to arbitration, 
under the auspices of the ICC. The main arbitration claim was to replace the regulatory 
decision and to allow the establishment of two fields: Lula field and Cernambi field. The 
mediate claim, or the expectation by dividing the area into two oil fields, was to reduce the 
amount of the so-called Special Participation, a government take which was estimated by 
ANP at about thirty billion dollars for the Lula field18. 
                                                          
16 Results of the 2nd Bidding Round 
 <http://www.anp.gov.br/brasil-rounds/round2/pdocs/Pinicial/Presultados.htm > accessed 29 July 2015 
17 In the ANP Board Resolution no. 568/2011, Administrative Process Nº: 48610.002618/2011, Board Meeting 
Nº: 624, 22 July 2011  was decided: ‘I) To reject the concessionaire's request to separate the Lula field into two 
parts, keeping it unique, which will be hereinafter "Lula field", covering the discovery made by well 1-BRSA-
369A- RJS and surrounding areas, including the area of the 4-BRSA-711-RJS well; and 
 II) To determine that the operator send a single development plan of the Lula field, including the areas 
mentioned above, in a maximum period of 90 days from the date of this Board Resolution’ 
<http://www.anp.gov.br/?id=2886> accessed  20 June 2015 
 





The ANP filed for an antiarbitration injunction in the Federal Justice System in Rio de 
Janeiro, arguing that the contents of the regulatory decision on the development plan could 
not be settled by arbitration since it is not a disposable right. The ANP argued that when there 
is a controversy over whether or not the right is disposable, only the judiciary can resolve it, 
thus preventing continuation of the arbitral proceeding19.  
Hence, the ANP brought an action to suspend the arbitration. The two main issues to 
be solved in the judicial case were: i) whether the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to define 
its own jurisdiction, even to determine arbitrability, leaving to recalcitrant parties the option 
to file an annulment action; ii) if the subject of controversy brought to the notice of 
arbitration is disposable or not20. 
About the first issue, related to who has jurisdiction to decide on the jurisdiction, 
whether the arbitral tribunal or the national court, the judge held that the decision is to be 
given by a national court. The decision considered that if the parties, or at least one, already 
know in advance that there is a suspicion that the right at stake is not disposable, the judge 
has jurisdiction to examine the allegation21.  
The Article 25 of BAA states that ‘if during the course of the proceedings, a dispute 
arises regarding rights that are not disposable, and once convinced that the final decision may 
depend thereon, the sole arbitrator or the arbitral tribunal may refer the parties to the State 
Court having jurisdiction, ordering a stay of the arbitral proceedings’. The judge considered 
that Article 25 of the BAA is directed towards the arbitral tribunal, not preventing the 
national courts from assessing the adequacy of the arbitration regarding its legal limits, which 
in this case involves the provisions of art. 1 of the BAA, that states that only disposable rights 








can be decided by arbitration. The court held that the legality control of the limits of the 
arbitration agreement was not to be reviewed solely by the arbitral tribunal and if there were 
doubts concerning the arbitrability of the dispute, it would be a waste of time to wait for the 
arbitral tribunal’s decision first in order to file suit to annul it after that22. 
On the second question, if the right is disposable or not, the court established that the 
discussion on the regulatory decision that stated that the block contained in the concession 
area is to be divided into two fields, is an insurgency against the ANP’s regulatory decision. 
According to the judge, the complaint is a concessionaire’s attempt to discuss the 
imperativeness of administrative acts in arbitration, which is not possible23. 
These two issues that arose in the Lula case, on the jurisdiction to decide on 
arbitrability and on the arbitrability of disputes related to State acts, will be broadly 
considered next. Due to the absence of consistent jurisprudence from the courts in this regard, 




Arbitrability involves the question of what subjects can be submitted to arbitration, 
placing limits on what may be adjudicated by an arbitral tribunal24. According to Lauren 
Brazier, arbitrability has been concerned with particular ‘subject-matters that cannot be 
decided by arbitration, even if the parties have otherwise validly agreed to arbitrate such 
matters’, because the matters inherently involve some sort of public interest. Instead, these 
                                                          
22 National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels Agency  (n 13) 
23 1st Federal Court of the Judiciary Section of Rio de Janeiro (n 14) 
24 Julian DM Lew, Loukas A Mistelis and Stefan M Kröll, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration 





subject-matters belong ‘exclusively to the domain of the courts’ as protectors of the public 
interest involved’25. 
Bernard Hanotiau argues that arbitrability can be challenged in two different ways. 
The first one is based on the quality of one of the parties, when this party is a State, a public 
collectivity or entity or a public body, and is named “subjective arbitrability” or “arbitrability 
ratione personae”. The second is based on the subject matter of the dispute, which the 
applicable national law has removed from the domain of arbitrable matters, and is named 
“objective arbitrability” or “arbitrability ratione materiae”’26.  
3.1. Subjective arbitrability  
 
Hanotiau observes that although initially the issue of subjective arbitrability was 
decided in accordance with the law determined by conflict of law rules, namely the law 
governing capacity, this method has been progressively abandoned and today the issue is 
generally determined by the application of a substantive rule of international law27. For the 
author, there seems to be general agreement that the subjective arbitrability of international 
disputes to which a State, a public entity or a public body is party is, despite the contents of 
the domestic law of the State or entity concerned, a principle of international public policy of 
the law of international arbitration28. 
Likewise, Julian D. M. Lew says that the issue of subjective arbitrability is governed 
by a substantive rule of international arbitration and not by the law of the state party. This 
rule requires state parties to honour the arbitration agreement, precluding them from relying 
                                                          
25Lauren Brazier, ‘The Arbitrability of Investor-State Taxation Disputes in International Commercial Arbitration’ 
32 Kluwer Law Online 1, 20.  
26 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘The Law Applicable to Arbitrability’ (2014) 26 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 875. 
27Ibid 876. 





on national restrictions to avoid the effects of arbitration agreements. This is derived from 
international arbitration practice and provisions in various laws and conventions 29 . In 
particular, the European Convention expressly provides for the subjective arbitrability of state 
parties and the ICSID Convention relies on the premise that a state party that has agreed to 
arbitrate is bound by its commitment30. Likewise, under Article 177(2) PIL31, a State, a state-
held enterprise or a state-owned organisation, as a party to an arbitration agreement, can 
neither rely on its own law for the purpose of challenging its own capacity nor can it invoke 
its own laws to contest the arbitrability of the dispute at hand32. 
Since the BAA was enacted in 1996, it had no express restriction for State 
participation in arbitration. In fact, the Brazilian Concessions’ Law33 and the Public-Private 
Partnerships Law34 already provided for State participation, and the STJ had recognized the 
validity of this provision in its decisions35. Recently, Law 13,129/2015 amended the BAA to 
include an express provision authorizing the direct and indirect public administration to 
resolve disputes related to disposable pecuniary rights by arbitration36. 
 Moreover, the Brazilian Law 9,478/97 (hereinafter named ‘Brazilian Petroleum 
Law’) states that the solution of disputes involving oil and gas agreements can occur by 
international arbitration37. Thus, there is no impediment to a public-sector entity being a party 
                                                          
29Lew, Mistelis and Kröll (n 24) 738. 
30 Ibid.  
31 Switzerland's Federal Code on Private International Law (CPIL)1 of December 18, 19872 
32 Patrick M Baron and Stefan Liniger, ‘A Second Look at Arbitrability: Approaches to Arbitration in the United 
States, Switzerland and Germany’ (2003) 19 Arbitration International 27. 
33 Brazilian Law 8,987/ 1995. 
34 Brazilian Law 11,079/2004. 
35 Camila Tomimatsu and Mariana Cattel, ‘The Recent Amendments to the Brazilian Arbitration Act – One Step 
Back, Two Steps Forward?’ <http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2015/06/30/the-recent-amendments-to-
the-brazilian-arbitration-act-one-step-back-two-steps-forward/> accessed 14 July 2015. 
36 Article 1, § 1, Brazilian Law 13,129/ 2015.  
37 Article 43, Brazilian Law 9,478/97 states that ‘The concession contract shall duly reflect the conditions of the 
tender announcement and the winning proposal shall have the following essential clauses: X - the rules for the 






to arbitration. In the Lula case, the ANP, as a state entity, has not argued either about 
contractual or statutory provisions against arbitration for administrative contracts, but about 
the matter of objective arbitrability. 
3.2. Objective arbitrability 
 
Arbitrability in essence is a matter of national public policy, which differs from one 
country to another. According to Patrick Baron and Stefan Liniger, judges of different 
countries will look at the question of whether a given dispute is arbitrable from different 
angles and arbitrators will take a yet different approach38. Besides that, State judges tend to 
decide according their national laws and interests and arbitrators seek a balance between the 
interests of the legal systems concerned in the dispute and the reasonable expectations of the 
parties of the proceeding39. 
The classic examples of subjects considered inarbitrable include certain issues arising 
in criminal, domestic relations, bankruptcy, real property and governmental sanctions 
matters40. It has been argued that certain types of investment contracts are not arbitrable since 
they involve aspects of sovereignty over natural resources or other issues of ius cogens, so 
that arbitrators are not authorized to pronounce on the validity of sovereign actions41. This 
work will analyse the objective arbitrability, especially related to the public policy objection 
presented by the ANP to deny the arbitrability of a dispute related to natural resources. 
 
 
                                                          
38 Baron and Liniger (n 32) 27. 
39 Ibid 28. 
40 Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Second edition, Kluwer Law International 2014) 949. 





4. Law applicable to determine arbitrability 
 
The practice of international arbitration proves that the issue of which law governs 
arbitrability is not an easy one and that the answer may depend upon the tribunal or court 
before which it arises. The  solution to the issue can vary depending on whether it is decided 
by an arbitral tribunal, a state court to which one of the parties has concurrently submitted the 
dispute in the course of a setting-aside or enforcement proceeding42. 
Brazier argues that a determination of arbitrability may arise at several stages in the 
arbitral process, and in several different forums. These include (a) before the tribunal at the 
beginning of the proceeding; (b) before a national court, either as a preliminary matter to be 
determined before the arbitration can go ahead, or as a question of whether the award should 
be set aside; and (c) before the court of enforcement43. At each stage, the question arises is 
what law governs arbitrability.  
 
4.1. Different forums and stages where the arbitrability issue can arise 
4.1.1. In national courts as a preliminary matter or a question of whether 
the award should be set aside  
 
Suppose one of the parties has commenced the arbitration in compliance with an 
arbitration clause and the other party considers that the dispute is not arbitrable and applies to 
a national court to stop the arbitration. How is the national court going to decide this issue of 
arbitrability? 
                                                          
42 Hanotiau (n 26) 878. 





According to Hanotiau, it will apply its own national law, and this is the appropriate 
view even if some authors and various courts hold that the law applicable to the validity of 
the arbitration clause should determine arbitrability44.  
Stravos Brekoulakis also believes that the best answer is the lex fori and that the 
provision of art. V(2)(a) of the NYC, although referring to the enforcement stage, has a wider 
effect than the scope of application, endorsing the lex fori even when the issue of arbitrability 
arises before a national court at other stages than enforcement, especially when national 
courts review arbitrability at the stage of challenge45. According to the author, most national 
provisions on challenge mirror the NYC art. V, and thus, make express reference to lex fori46.  
According to the tendency, the issue of arbitrability should be decided without 
reference to a domestic law, through the application of an international rule of substantive 
law47. For example, in the United States District Court decision of 29 March 1991, the Court 
emphasized that that “courts of NYC signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is 
sought to be enforced could not decline enforcement of such agreements on the basis of 
parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would diminish the mutually binding 
nature of the agreements.”48  According to this view, the principle of favor arbitrandum 
should prevail in case of doubt49. Nevertheless, the choice of transnational public policy is 
not its most conventional one, since the function of public policy is to exclude agreements, 
rules or decisions that oppose certain fundamental values or interests50. 
                                                          
44 Hanotiau (n 26) 883. 
45 Stavros Brekoulakis, ‘Law Applicable to Arbitrability: Revisiting the Revisited Lex Fori’ 2 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1414323> accessed 15 July 2015. 
46 ibid. 
47 Bernard Hanotiau, ‘La Loi Applicable a L’Arbitrabilite Du Litige’ [1998] Int’l Bus. LJ 755, 402. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 





If national statutes provide for the possibility of setting aside an award if it is contrary 
to public policy or if the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration, the national court 
concerned will normally apply its own national law to decide the issue51. The UNCITRAL 
Model Law also provides52 that an arbitral award may be set aside by the court mentioned in 
Article 653 only if the court finds that the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of 
settlement by arbitration under the law of this State54. 
Finally, even applying national law, national courts cannot use public policy 
arguments broadly, in order to restrain international arbitration or set aside arbitral awards55. 
In Hanotiau’s words: 
(...) it is certain that the field of arbitrable matters is considerably expanding. 
On the one hand, the role that public policy plays in the field of arbitrability 
has been considerably narrowed. On the other hand, material rules specific to 
international arbitration are emerging in national legal systems, either in the 
case law, or in newly adopted statutes56. 
 
4.1.2. In the enforcement stage 
 
When raised at the time of enforcement, the applicable law is the one of the place 
where it will have to be enforced. The enforcement judge will normally apply art. V(2) of the 
NYC. Despite the waning role of public policy, the prominence of lex fori as the most 
relevant law to determine arbitrability remains unquestionable, especially when the issue 
                                                          
51 Hanotiau (n 26) 883. 
52 Article 34(2)(b)(i) (2), UNCITRAL Model Law 
53  Article 6, UNCITRAL Model Law  
54 Hanotiau (n 47) 402. 






arises before a national court at the enforcement stage, when the express mandate of the NYC 
leaves very little space, if any, for a different view57. 
Reference is often made to the decision of the US Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Parsons and Whittemore Overseas Co Inc v Socit-Gn&ale de L'Industrie du Papier (Rakta)58, 
in which the Court of Appeals decided that only a violation of the forum State's most basic 
notions of morality and justice would justify refusal to enforce an arbitral award59. The BAA, 
mirroring the NYC, expressly states that national courts shall deny recognition or 
enforcement if, in accordance with Brazilian law, the subject matter in dispute is not capable 
of settlement by arbitration60.  
 
4.1.3. By the arbitral tribunal 
 
If the question arises before the tribunal at the beginning of the proceeding, which law 
should the arbitrators apply? Should they consider the fact that the award would subsequently 
have to be enforced in another country?  
Hanoutiau says the arbitral tribunal will decide it by application of the law that 
governs the arbitration agreement, ie, the autonomously chosen law61. According to him, this 
is the solution expressly provided by art. II(1) and art. V(1)(a) of the NYC. However, in most 
cases parties have not provided any express indication in this respect62. 
                                                          
57 Brekoulakis (n 45) 2. 
58 Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. Inc. v Soceite Generale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA) 508 F.2d 969 
(2nd Cir. 1974) 
59 Locknie Hsu, ‘Public Policy Considerations in International Arbitration: Costs and Other Issues A View from 
Singapore’ (2009) 26 Journal of International Arbitration 101, 884. 
60 Article 39, BAA 






Lauren Brazier makes a thorough analysis of the most appropriate law to determine 
arbitrability. First, she considers the law governing the arbitration agreement, but argues that 
this approach takes the autonomy justification for using the law governing the arbitration 
agreement to an extreme, since it is one thing to respect parties’ choices as to the applicable 
law, and quite another for that choice to be allowed to undermine the basis of the doctrine of 
arbitrability. Thus, the law governing the arbitration agreement would be an unusual starting 
point for determining arbitrability in the investor-State context63. 
Lauren Brazier also wonders if the lex arbitri or the law of the seat of arbitration 
should govern arbitrability, but finds that it is unlikely to have a close connection with the 
underlying commercial agreement, since the choice of the seat is usually determined by 
factors such as convenience or neutrality, and not by the law of the specific forum chosen64.   
Finally, Brazier argues that the most appropriate view is that arbitrability should be 
determined by a transnational public policy, defined as the set of principles, not pertaining to 
the law of a particular State and reliant on consensus between States. The transnational 
approach is appropriate because national public policy rules applying to arbitrability in 
international arbitration are increasingly less restrictive than those which apply in domestic 
arbitrations and because transnational public policy is not tied to the law that the parties have 
selected, separating the law governing arbitrability from issues involving the choice of the 
parties65. 
Nevertheless, this view may lead to unwanted practical consequences in cases where 
the law of the place of arbitration contains a narrower concept of arbitrability than the 
                                                          
63 Brazier (n 25) 5. 
64 Ibid 6. 





“genuinely international public policy”66. In these cases, necessary measures of support from 
the courts of the place of arbitration may not be available, the award may be open to 
challenge and the unsuccessful party may later attack a genuine matter of international public 
policy during the enforcement stage67.  
In most cases, tribunals determine the arbitrability of a dispute based on provisions of 
the place of arbitration68. Although arbitral tribunals have no duty to apply lex fori, it is 
accepted as the safest option for a tribunal, in order to avoid a potential challenge of the 
award in the national court of the place of arbitration, which in turn would be bound to apply 
lex fori69.  
 
5. Jurisdiction   
 
The Kompetenz-Kompetenz principle refers to the allocation of authority between an 
arbitral tribunal and a national court over the interpretation and enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. The principle, developed in Germany, authorizes an arbitral tribunal to determine 
its own jurisdiction without requesting a judicial decision70. 
Natasha Wyss71 says that the right of an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction 
is generally accepted throughout the world. However, the doctrine has developed into a legal 
term of art in most countries, such as "Kompetenz-Kompetenz" in Germany; "competence de 
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la competence" in France, and "competence of competence" in England, and legal 
implications of the doctrine change with its translation. Likewise, William Park says that in 
commercial arbitration, it depends largely on national law and institutional rules, making it 
more accurate to speak of Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrines in the plural: 
To illustrate, in the United States courts may entertain applications for 
jurisdictional declarations at any time, and may order full examination of the 
parties’ intent to arbitrate. If German courts are asked to hear a matter which 
one side asserts must be arbitrated, they decide immediately on the validity 
and scope of the arbitration agreement. In neighbouring France, such 
challenges normally wait until an award has been made. In England, litigants 
have a right to declaratory decisions on arbitral authority, but only if they take 
no part in the arbitration72. 
About the question of who has jurisdiction to determine arbitrability, the United 
States has a liberal approach. According to Kenneth R Pierce, the court shall see whether the 
parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration, 
but admits it is hard to say, since parties usually incorporate a standard broad clause into their 
contracts without thinking about it73. 
The timing of judicial review is also an issue. On one hand, going to court at the 
beginning of the proceeding can save expense for a respondent improperly joined to the 
arbitration. On the other hand, judicial resources may be preserved by delaying review until 
the end of the case, by which time the parties might have settled74. The French model delays 
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court consideration of jurisdictional matters until the award review stage, which can reduce 
the chance of dilatory tactics, since a bad-faith respondent will be less able to add the cost of 
a court challenge while the arbitration is pending75. 
However, the high costs of arbitration and the principle of legal certainty have even 
made the courts of Germany, the birthplace of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, recognize the 
possibility of judicial review of the arbitral jurisdiction in the pre-arbitration phase76. Under 
section 1032(2) of the German ZPO, a German court may only decide the arbitrators' 
jurisdiction if requested to do so before the arbitral tribunal is constituted77. Brekoulakis 
observes that section 1032 now regulates the allocation of tasks between national courts and 
arbitral tribunals and it is no longer possible for the parties to provide that an arbitral tribunal 
will have the final and binding say for German courts in relation to the determination of the 
validity of an arbitration agreement. In particular, a state court may assume jurisdiction over a 
claim on the jurisdiction of a tribunal, but only at a stage prior to the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, since after that, an arbitral tribunal acquires the exclusive jurisdiction to 
decide on the validity of the arbitration agreement78. 
According to Brekoulakis, the principle of competence-competence asserts that an 
arbitral tribunal has the jurisdiction to address a claim which undermines the premise of its 
own authority, providing arbitrators with the power to begin with the question 79 . The 
competence-competence principle arguably generates two effects. The positive effect means 
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that the arbitral tribunal has jurisdiction to decide on its own jurisdiction80 and the negative 
effect attributes exclusive jurisdiction to arbitral tribunals to examine the validity of an 
arbitration agreement. National courts have to refrain from reviewing the jurisdiction of a 
tribunal until the stage of challenge or enforcement of an arbitral award81. 
Brekoulakis says that while the principle of competence-competence started as a legal 
convention aiming to strengthen the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, it has now developed 
into a legal paradox82. For the author, while the positive effect of the competence-competence 
principle is essential to maintain the autonomy of arbitration, the negative effect undermines 
legitimacy of arbitration proceedings, leading to an overly expensive pro-arbitration policy 
that encourages an anti-arbitration reaction83.  
According to the competence-competence principle, an arbitral tribunal has authority 
to decide upon its jurisdiction and, in making such a decision, it will review the respective 
arbitration agreement, observing general legal principles that affects its jurisdiction. This 
decision will include an assessment as to whether the dispute is arbitrable, but the 
determination is not necessarily final84. According to Patrick M. Baron and Stefan Liniger, 
the arbitral tribunal's determination might be subject to judicial review and in a demand to set 
aside an award or at the recognition and enforcement stage, a court may take a second look at 
the arbitrability of a particular matter85.  
The First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan86 case is often mentioned on the matter of 
application of Kompetenz-Kompetenz. In this case, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the 
arbitral tribunal on the matter of its jurisdiction and determined that the Kaplans were not 
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bound to arbitrate, reversing the lower court confirmation of the award. A unanimous 
Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision, stating that the arbitrability was a 
question for the courts to decide87. 
Another theory connected with this approach is called the “second look doctrine”, 
which although not holding the arbitration agreement to be invalid, preserves the subsequent 
possibility to annul or refuse recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards that are contrary 
to the lex fori88. In the emblematic Dallah case89 the UK Supreme Court decided to deny 
recognition of the arbitral award, following what it termed an independent investigation of 
whether the tribunal had jurisdiction. The Court revisited the arbitral tribunal’s decision on 
jurisdiction and considered it was not bound or restricted by the tribunal’s conclusions90.   
According to Gary Bornand, the regrettable course of the Dallah case and the conflict 
between the French and English decisions are pathological, since the most fundamental 
objectives of the NYC were violated, including ensuring uniform treatment of arbitral awards 
and facilitating the effective enforcement of such awards in the Convention’s Contracting 
States91. 
Brazilian courts can analyze the question of arbitrability even during an ongoing 
arbitration proceeding if the question is raised by an arbitrator, as expressly stated in art. 25 
of the BAA. The answer is not so obvious if the jurisdiction issue is brought to national courts 
during the arbitral proceeding by the party that believes the dispute is not arbitrable. As 
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mentioned before, in the first-instance decision of the Lula case92, the judge held that the 
judiciary has the final word on jurisdiction when the question is brought to a national court by 
one of the parties, even during the arbitral proceeding. The judge decided that the arbitration 
shall be suspended until the national court decides on the arbitrability issue. 
 
6. Arbitrability  
6.1. Public policy 
 
In many countries, arbitration statutes deal only with domestic arbitration, and do not 
cover all aspects of arbitration93. Most recent statutes do not regulate questions of arbitrability 
and problems that affect foreign state capacity to arbitrate, including sovereign immunity 
from suit and from execution of the award94.  
Although NYC sets forth two bases for non-recognition , the public policy of the 
enforcement forum (in Article V(2)(b)) and the nonarbitrability rules of the enforcement 
forum (in Article V(2)(a)), in many respects, the doctrine of public policy parallels the 
nonarbitrability doctrine95. In both, even if parties agree to arbitrate their disputes, their 
agreements to arbitrate may be unenforceable in some jurisdictions as applied to limited 
categories of issues. The rationale is the same and bases on the premise that there are 
unacceptable conflicts between the award or arbitration agreement and basic public policies 
and legal norms of a particular state, which that state is permitted, exceptionally, to invoke to 
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justify non-recognition of an otherwise valid award or agreement96. In Lula case, for instance, 
public policy grounds were used to support that the right is not disposable because of the 
public interest involved and, thus, the dispute could not be settled by arbitration according to 
BAA. 
Despite that the limits of arbitrability usually concern public policy grounds, few laws 
expressly determine what public policy is. The interpretation will depend on the context of 
each country. In arbitration-friendly countries, not all public policy rules can impair 
arbitration97. Despite a general bias in favour of enforcement98, there are substantive and 
procedural limits beyond which arbitrators may not go. Enforcement may be refused if an 
award purports to decide allegations involving the enforcing country’s fundamental economic 
policies or if the arbitration proceeding was procedurally deficient in some fundamental 
aspect99. 
Hsu says that when international jurists and experts were formulating Article 34 of the 
Model Law, there was a great deal of discussion as to its scope, but the final interpretation 
was narrow: 
In discussing the term ‘public policy’, it was understood that it was not 
equivalent to the political stance or international policies of a State but 
comprised the fundamental notions and principles of justice. It was 
understood that the term ‘public policy’, which was used in the 1958 New 
York Convention and many other treaties, covered fundamental principles of 
law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects. Thus, instances 
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such as corruption, bribery or fraud and similar serious cases would constitute 
a ground for setting aside100. 
The differences between the various approaches are diminishing with the gradual 
enlargement of the scope of arbitration in most countries. There are areas where the issue of 
arbitrability traditionally arises such as antitrust, securities transactions, insolvency, 
intellectual property rights, illegality and fraud, bribery and corruption, and investments in 
natural resources101. 
A consensus also seems to exist regarding the existence of two approaches to public 
policy, depending on whether the arbitration is classified as domestic or international102. Even 
some claims that are not arbitrable in domestic arbitration, based on public policy grounds, 
have been found to be arbitrable, including securities and antitrust claims103. Troy L. Harris 
says that ‘while a public policy argument is sometimes dismissed as the last resort of the 
desperate, public policy is also ‘a variable notion’ that is ‘open-textured and flexible’104. 
In the United States, courts have set forth limitations to the parties' freedom to 
arbitrate disputes in specific areas of law that were traditionally considered to be within the 
exclusive domain of state and federal courts, in particular those involving strong public 
interest105. Over the last couple of decades, however, U.S. courts have increasingly taken an 
arbitration-friendly approach and limited public policy considerations to fewer types of 
controversies106. 
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This approach was influenced primarily by the decision in the Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler- Plymouth Inc case107, which is often referred to in connection with 
the theory that a dispute which is not arbitrable under national law can, nonetheless, be 
submitted to international arbitration. Accordingly, an arbitration agreement considered 
invalid under national law can still be a valid basis for the jurisdiction of arbitrators in 
international arbitration108. In Mitsubishi vs Soler109, the U.S. Supreme Court held that an 
automobile dealer’s claim under the U.S. antitrust law could be decided in a Japanese 
arbitration proceeding, by being sensitive to the need for predictability in the resolution of 
disputes, which requires enforcement of the parties’ agreement, even assuming that it would 
not happen in a domestic context.110 
International public policy is no longer the prerogative of arbitral tribunals; courts 
have started to adhere to it, especially in jurisdictions where arbitration is a traditional 
method of dispute resolution. In emerging countries like Brazil, the question of whether the 
international approach will be adopted remains to be answered111. 
 
6.2. Public policy in Brazil  
 
The reason for limiting arbitrability consists primarily of the desire to protect public 
policy of countries, which concerns in protecting the public interest and the weaker party in 
the proceeding112. National public policy is composed of the country’s internal and external 
public policy. The internal policy comprises national policies recognized in customary law 
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and legislation promulgated to regulate certain situations, which cannot be avoided or by-
passed by the parties 113. The external policy is part of the country’s public policy applied to 
its external relationships, also called international public policy 114 . The expression 
“international public policy” (or in French, “ordre public international”) also concerns the 
concept of public policy as applied in private international law, as a barrier to the application 
of a foreign statute by a state court on its rulings and on recognition of foreign arbitral 
awards115. 
Before the enactment of the BAA, Article 17 of the Introductory Act to the Rules of 
Brazilian Law116 was the general rule that applied to the recognition of all foreign judgments, 
including foreign arbitral awards, by establishing that ‘the laws, acts and judgments of 
another country and any declarations of will, shall not have effect in Brazil when they offend 
national sovereignty, public policy or good conduct’117. 
The BAA does not significantly alter Brazil's practical limitations on arbitrability, 
which can serve as argument for a reluctant government to refuse arbitration of investment 
disputes118. The BAA limits the subject matter of arbitration to pecuniary rights of which the 
parties can freely dispose. This provision leaves open the possibility to frustrate an 
investment agreement because, under Brazilian law, neither the investor nor the government 
can "freely dispose" of the rights at issue119.  
Brazilian courts have traditionally permitted themselves flexibility in interpreting the 
public policy defence to arbitration, raising concerns that a foreign investor might have 
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difficulties to compel a Brazil state entity to arbitrate pursuant to an investment contract120. 
Actually, some commentators have already opined that issues of "public rights" and "State 
sovereignty", both crucial to investment disputes, are outside the domain of arbitrability 
under Brazilian law121. 
Brazil has been hesitant to provide broad-based consent to arbitration of international 
investment disputes through domestic law or treaty122. Nowadays, investors can still obtain 
some protection by including arbitration provisions in their concession or investment 
agreements with the Brazilian government123. Therefore, investment arbitration agreements 
and awards involving the Brazilian government remain firmly based on the commercial 
arbitration regime124.  
Where arbitration is conducted under the ICSID Rules, all Member States are obliged 
to automatically treat awards as local judgments, without any defence against enforcement, 
including public policy grounds125. Thus, in many international disputes, arbitration is not 
just a preferable way to obtain compensation; it is the only viable means of doing so126. 
Pedro Martini stresses that a fundamental distinction between arbitration against the 
State in Brazil and investment-treaty-arbitrations is that, while in arbitration against the 
Brazilian public administration the objective arbitrability refers to the nature of the claim, ie, 
if it relates to disposable rights, regardless of the context of such claim, in investment-treaty 
arbitration it is quite the opposite. It is not the nature of the claim itself that determines its 
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capacity to be submitted to arbitration, but the context of the claim and of the activity of the 
investor in the host state, if there is an investment or not127 . 
The main reasons for Brazil’s refusal to sign the ICSID Convention of 1964 were 
primarily directed at its investor-state arbitration mechanism, which Brazil's delegate 
believed contradicted the practice of direct state-to-state arbitration to resolve disputes 
involving treatment of their respective nationals. Brazil's delegate also suggested that 
investor-state arbitration violated constitutional principles of the Brazilian legal system, such 
as the principle that the judiciary holds a monopoly on justice. The final criticism was that it 
favoured foreign investors to the detriment of domestic investors128. 
More than 50 years later, most Latin America countries have ratified the ICSID and 
Brazil's own approach to international commercial arbitration has evolved considerably129. 
Brazil has a modern and effective Arbitration Act, a more proarbitration approach by courts 
and the old view of unconstitutionality was remedied by Brazilian Federal Supreme Court130. 
Thus, most of the old criticisms are no longer tenable.  
It is too early to say whether the BAA will satisfactorily compel enforcement of 
investment arbitration awards against the Brazilian government131. If Brazil's courts choose to 
apply the policy-based exceptions to enforcement broadly, investment arbitration 
effectiveness is likely to fail132. 
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6.3. The sovereignty objection 
6.3.1. Sovereignty over natural resources 
 
Even a cursory look at the relationship between foreign investors and host States 
during the twentieth century exposes the uncertainties of this interdependence. The first half 
of that century saw the creation and then rapid growth of the international energy industry 
and many governments granted generous concessions to multinational oil corporations, with 
the title to the oil conveyed to the companies under long-term concessions or leases, with low 
royalties payable to the government133. 
Unsurprisingly, developing nations soon changed this course. Nationalization of the 
oil industry, termination of those same concession or lease agreements and expropriation of 
the assets of foreign companies prevailed in the second half of the twentieth century134. On 
December 21, 1952, the United Nations General Assembly issued Resolution 626 (VII), 
providing for the right of peoples to exploit their natural resources as part of their sovereignty. 
It was the first General Assembly text to use the notion of ‘permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources’135.  
On December 14, 1962, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 1803 (XVII), 
stating that ‘1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural 
wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of 
the well-being of the people of the State concerned’136. The consequences of this statement 
increased intervention of governments, both of developed and developing countries, 
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especially during the 1960s and 1970s137. However, the same Resolution also provided that 
nationalization measures should only be implemented for public purposes, security or 
national interest and that the investor should receive “appropriate compensation” in 
compliance with domestic and international law138. 
In the Resolution 3281 (XXIX), dated 26 July 1974, the General Assembly adopted 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. This text enhanced that the right to 
nationalize foreign-owned property but required appropriate compensation, and admitted that 
if compensation was not paid, the State’s international obligation would not respect good 
faith139. 
In the twentieth century, the growing involvement of States in commercial activities 
progressively eroded the absolute immunity doctrine140. Reflecting these changes, the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court considered that once a State enters the market place and acts like a 
private party, there is no more justification for allowing that State to avoid the economic 
consequences of its actions141. The trade-off is properly described by Baade as follows: 
The customary international law rule of sovereign immunity illustrates the 
central importance of state sovereignty in the modern world. The restrictive 
theory of such immunity, on the other hand, demonstrates the need to 
accommodate respect for foreign sovereign rights to new circumstances, such 
as state trading.  As there is ‘no clear cut dividing line between acts done ‘jure 
imperii’ and acts done ‘jure gestionis’, one must consider what indicators are 
                                                          
137 Hassan Sedigh, ‘What Level of Host State Interference Amounts to a Taking under Contemporary 
International Law’ (2001) 2 J. World Investment 631, 638. 
138 B.S. Vasani; D.E. Vielleville, Esq (n 127) 
139 Ibid  






available as to whether an act is jure imperii or jure gestionis and  the focus is 
on the nature of the act, or by analogy, the dispute142.  
The next section will examine the limits on the use of sovereignty as a justification to 
deny arbitrability of certain disputes.  
 
6.3.2. Jure imperii acts and jure gestionis acts 
 
In public international law, the competence of States in respect of their territory is 
usually described in terms of sovereignty and jurisdiction. While jurisdiction refers to the 
ability of a State to exercise control over people, sovereign immunity refers to the idea that 
the actions of a foreign State lie outside the jurisdictional competence of other States143. 
Whilst initially sovereign immunity was much broader, a doctrine of restrictive immunity has 
developed and distinguishes between jure imperii acts (governmental acts) and jure gestionis 
acts (acts relating to the commercial activities of the State).144  
A State may reasonably expect to be immune from legal proceedings in a foreign 
court only in relation to its sovereign activities, while no immunity exists for activities of a 
purely commercial and private nature. 145  Furthermore, under the doctrine of restrictive 
immunity, the concept of waiver of immunity was extended and it is no longer necessary that 
a State expressly waive its immunity after the dispute has arisen; waiver can be obtained in 
advance.146 
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In commercial arbitration, the arbitration is endorsed by the State as 'private', based on 
its determination to respect the autonomous decisions of non-State actors to displace the 
courts' competence, though a mutually constructed alternative 147 . The authority for 
commercial arbitration and for the power to define lex mercatoria as a source of law 
originates from the State’s choice to withdraw a particular dispute or contractual relationship 
from the primary jurisdiction of the courts and subject it to arbitration148. 
The principle of sovereignty is the cornerstone of the power of the State to enact tax 
law 149 . Conventionally, taxation issues have been viewed as indivisible from State 
sovereignty, since it directly implies the funding by which governments operate, so it is 
understandable that national courts seek a monopoly on litigation of such a vital sovereign 
prerogative 150 . This attachment to State sovereignty is also the prevailing view about 
activities related to natural resources.  
 Major energy projects typically involve a long-term contract between a host State and 
an investor, under which the State grants a privilege to conduct an enterprise for a defined 
period151. The State transfers to the concessionaire or lessee certain powers that normally 
would belong to the State, but retains ultimate ownership of the right, which makes these 
contracts partly public and partly private in nature152. While some acts of a State related to 
exploration of natural resources may be considered jure imperii, States also undertake a 
variety of commercial activities that do not directly involve their sovereignty. This requires 
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defining the parameters of sovereignty defence, in order to ensure that the scope of 
arbitrability is not too wide or narrow153. 
Brazier took the example of investor-State taxation disputes in international 
commercial arbitration to advocate that sovereignty does not inhibit the arbitrability of all 
taxation disputes between investors and States154. Rather, there is a distinction to be drawn 
between taxation disputes that directly imply sovereignty of States and are not arbitrable, and 
disputes as to taxation that are merely contractual in nature, only indirectly involving 
sovereignty, and thus are arbitrable155.  
Brazier accentuates the difference between disputes that involve the direct exercise of 
sovereign authority (e.g., substantive tax law matters), and those that involve the indirect 
recognition of its effect on private or commercial relationships (e.g., the application of 
specific contractual standards)156. She gives the example of a provision stating that a tax 
payable on income is capped at a certain rate, what may raise substantive tax law issues, such 
as what constitutes income. This determination would involve a direct exercise of the State’s 
sovereign authority over tax law. However, if the parties agreed as to what constitutes income, 
compliance with this kind of provision will be arbitrable, since this involves merely the 
indirect effect of a tax law, in order to assess compliance with the contract. By following this 
distinction, Brazier supports that stabilization provisions are arbitrable, because they involve 
questions of compliance with the contractual standard, since a State cannot disregard its 
promise of a stable framework.157 
This framing is useful to examine contractual problems in disputes involving 
concession agreements in the oil and gas industry, such as the one that arose in the Lula case. 
                                                          
153 Ibid 17. 
154 Ibid 2. 
155 Ibid 16. 
156 Ibid 15. 





In that case, the discussion hinges on the concept of “oil field” and the consequent amount of 
government take payable under the category of “special participation”. This is owed when 
there is high volume of hydrocarbons or high profit margin158, and the rate varies from 10% 
to 40%, applying on sales revenue adjusted by deductions allowed by law.159 
The rationale in the Lula case is similar to Lauren Brazier’s approach to taxation 
disputes. The concessionaires argued that the ANP breached the contract in order to increase 
revenues, since the concept of “oil field”, in discussion, was incorporated in the concession 
agreement. Thus, the dispute would be arbitrable, because it is founded on the economic 
consequences of the State’s interpretation of the concession agreement and because the State 
reneged on its promise of a stable framework. 
In opposition, the ANP argued that a provision stating that the government take is 
payable in a certain amount may raise substantive law issues, such as what constitutes an “oil 
field”. The definition of “oil field” determines the amount of special participation that the 
concessionaries have to pay, since the bigger the area considered as a field, the bigger the 
production and higher the rate of special participation due. The ANP contended that the 
definition of “oil field” in the concession agreement could only be made by the State, because  
regulation is strictly related to sovereignty. This argument was accepted by the court160.  
Nevertheless, there are decisions in Brazilian courts that clearly recognize the 
differences between the diverse activities that the State exercises and the public interest 
involved in each case, conferring distinct treatment to them. For example, in Brazil, the 
Public Attorney’s Office needs to intervene in cases involving non-disposable rights. There 
                                                          
158 KPMG Auditores Independentes. ‘A Guide to Brazilian Oil and Gas Taxation’ (2011) 
<http://www.kpmg.com/br/pt/estudos_analises/artigosepublicacoes/paginas/brazilian-oil-gas-taxation.aspx> 
accessed 29 July 2015 
159 Law 9,478/97, Decree 2,705/98 and ANP Edicts 10/99 and 102/99. 





are various decisions, however, holding that for the effect of such intervention, certain 
interests of governmental entities are not non-disposable, making a distinction between the 
public interest and pecuniary rights, so that governmental entities may not invoke the public 
interest to avoid the duty to indemnify damages caused. This was the gist of the decision by 
the justice Minister Luiz Fux161, which held that the State, when honouring its responsibility, 
and paying the corresponding indemnification, places itself in the position of serving the 
‘public interest’. On the other hand, when it evades its responsibility under concern for 
minimizing its pecuniary losses, it clearly pursues a secondary interest, subjectively 
pertaining to the state apparatus, engendering enrichment at the cost of damage to others. 
Moreover, the doctrine and jurisprudence are settled that the public interest is inalienable, but 
not the interest of the government and, in this last situation, the intervention of the Public 
Attorneys Office is not considered necessary. 
 
7. The decision in Lula case: a critical approach 
7.1. The decision on the jurisdiction  
 
Despite the judge's finding in the Lula case that national courts have jurisdiction to 
analyse jurisdiction during arbitration proceedings, the topic is controversial in Brazil. In 
other recent case162, the ANP also rejected concessionaires’ development plans, for the same 
reason of the blurred concept of “oil field”, and similar disputes arose. 
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In the case of the Baleias (“Whales”) field163, the development plan was denied and 
the concessionaire started arbitration before the ICC, prompting the ANP to file an injunction 
action in national courts aiming to stop the arbitration. In this case, however, the decision of 
another federal court (5th Federal Court of Rio de Janeiro) was completely different from the 
one given in Lula case.  
The judge of the 5th Federal Court decided that art. 25 of the BAA, which ANP 
invoked to support prior judicial definition of jurisdiction, does not indicate that the judiciary 
should rule in advance. Instead, the Court decided that there is a first assessment to be made 
by arbitration. In addition, the judge continued, Article 25 deals with the procedure to be 
adopted in cases where the inalienable right appears as a prejudicial question, not as the main 
subject matter. Thus, the situation discussed attracts application of Article 20164 of the BAA, 
so the claim of lack of jurisdiction must be addressed to the arbitral tribunal, at the first 
opportunity, after the commencement of the arbitration. According to paragraph 2 of Article 
20, with the rejection of the claim by the arbitral tribunal, the arbitration shall proceed 
normally, with the possibility of contesting the award in court only by way of an annulment 
action for setting aside the award165. Thus, the judge held that rules on the relationship 
between jurisdiction and arbitration are to be examined by the judiciary only at the end166, a 
solution opposed to the one given in Lula case. 
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The concessionaries then argued that the ANP did not obey the judicial decision 
related to the Whales field, so they filed an action called “Conflict of Competence”167 , 
directly to the STJ. The conflict is between the Brazilian state court and the arbitral tribunal 
constituted under the Rules of the ICC, by deciding on the validity and existence of the 
arbitration clause inserted on the concession contract signed between the concessionaire and 
the ANP. 
The reporting judge assigned to the conflict of competence case, Judge Nancy 
Andrighi, noted:  
The promulgation of Law 9,307/96 made it necessary to preserve, to the 
greatest extent possible, the authority of the arbitrator as the de facto and de 
jure judge for questions linked to the merit of the cause. Rejecting that 
provision would empty the hollow out the Arbitration Law, permitting the 
same right to be considered simultaneously, even if in perfunctory form, by 
the state court and arbitral court, often with serious possibilities of conflicting 
interpretations of the same facts168. 
The STJ primarily considered itself to be competent to settle conflicts of competence 
between State courts and arbitral tribunals. It also stressed that it is essential that the powers 
of the arbitrators be preserved and stated that until a final decision is rendered regarding the 
dispute, the arbitral tribunal has competence to rule over urgent and provisional measures 
between the parties, and every administrative or judicial proceeding against the 
concessionaire, present or future, shall be stayed169. 
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Therefore, Brazilian courts have not yet reached a definitive decision on the 
jurisdiction to determine arbitrability. The pending decision in the conflict of competence 
action in the case of the Baleias field, despite having its direct effects only on the object in 
dispute, will provide an important precedent and help to construct jurisprudence in this regard. 
Meanwhile, one can notice that the first instance decisions in the Lula case and Baleias case, 
although based on similar facts, were absolutely totally different. 
 
7.2. The decision on arbitrability 
 
The federal court’s decision in the case of Lula field took into consideration that the 
clause 1.26 of the concession agreement170 expressly states that the legal definition of ‘oil and 
natural gas field’ is incorporated into the contract, by stating that ‘field’ has the same 
meaning as ‘oil and natural gas field’, as defined in the Brazilian Petroleum Law. It states that 
for the purposes of this Law and its regulation, Oil or Natural Gas Field is the area producing 
oil or natural gas from a continuous reservoir or more than one reservoir at variable depths, 
including the facilities and equipment intended for production171. 
The concessionaire argued that after exploring the area, two fields were discovered, 
named "Lula" and "Cernambi". Given these findings, the operator submitted to two different 
development plans and two declarations of commerciality to the ANP, since they were 
separate fields from a geological standpoint172. The judge of the First Federal Court of Rio de 
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Janeiro 173  considered that the decision on definition of fields falls under the ANP’s 
supervisory remit, resulting from the police power, stated in Article 78 of the National Tax 
Code174. The judge held that the decision was taken under the discretionary power available 
to the public administration, so recourse to arbitration encroaches on the imperatives of 
administrative acts175.  
The question that arises is to what extent a government may affect a private right, 
even for a legitimate public purpose, by regulation, either general in nature or by specific 
actions, without having to pay compensation176. Approving or denying the development plan 
can be considered an act of state sovereignty. However, there is another view that even being 
sovereign, the act generates pecuniary damages and frustrates the expectations of the 
concessionaires. Since the concept of “oil field” was incorporated in the contract, the 
unpredictability of the interpretation could have caused pecuniary damages to the oil 
companies, which would be arbitrable.  
During the course of the Middle East oil nationalizations, some governments invoked 
their domestic law to allege that concessions were administrative contracts. In countries 
inspired by French administrative law, a contract may include exorbitant clauses allowing the 
government to amend or modify the service provider’s obligations. Accordingly, States 
argued that concession agreements, as administrative contracts, were subject to the changes 
and modifications within the State’s policy powers177.  
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The arbitral awards issued in the 1970s followed the wave of unilateral government 
actions and tested the contract-based stability mechanisms developed by investors in the 
preceding years178. In LIAMCO v Libya 179, the arbitrator decided that both under Libyan law 
and UN Resolutions, a State possesses, as an attribute of its sovereignty, the right to 
nationalize all things belonging to any person in its jurisdiction, if such a measure is not 
discriminatory and is for a legitimate public purpose. In the LIAMCO case, the arbitrator held 
that although the nationalization was for economic reasons, the right contrasted with the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda, accepted under Libyan law and recognized as an 
international custom and case law precedent180.  
In the case of Texaco vs Lybia181, the sole arbitrator held the Libyan nationalization 
measures to ineffective with respect to an international contract182. The award listed three 
tests of internationalization of investment agreements, any one of which was said to suffice: 
an agreement to arbitrate; reference to general principles of law or international law as the 
applicable law; or that the agreement be an economic development agreement183. 
Published arbitral awards have not tackled the legality and binding nature of 
stabilization clauses restricting the right to regulate, and the repercussion of regulatory 
changes not amounting to expropriations184. Nevertheless, it is certain that states cannot 
invoke domestic law rules to violate its obligations, and this may include outright 
expropriation in breach of a clause, or regulatory change in breach of a clause. In the case of 
economic equilibrium clauses, parties are under an obligation to negotiate in good faith so as 
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to restore the economic equilibrium following regulatory change, and, in this context, 
payment of compensation emerges as the main legal effect of such breaches185.  
Patrick Wautelet observes that the application of international law does not exclude 
possibility of a contract also being governed by national law, if the parties expressly indicated 
their choice for such a law, but the application of national law does not hinder the application 
of international law186. 
The significance of the protection against expropriation is not primarily protection 
against outright seizure of investments by the host country, but rather the protections against 
various forms of indirect or creeping expropriation such as regulations or confiscatory 
taxation that undermine the operation or enjoyment of the investment 187 . Indeed, it is 
accepted as a principle of international law, normally referred to as police power or eminent 
domain, that a sovereign State has the right to regulate the economic and commercial 
activities in its territory. However, it is questionless this right is not unqualified and State 
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8. An international approach to State acts and protection of investors in the oil and gas 
industry 
8.1. Substantive considerations on the Lula case 
 
The judicial decision in the Lula case was limited to the ANP’s claim to stop the 
arbitral proceeding based on the arguments that national courts have jurisdiction and that the 
right in dispute is not disposable189. Nevertheless, once the jurisdiction to settle the conflict is 
defined, a decision is to be given on the merits, about whether some kind of damage was 
caused by the State act and whether any kind of compensation is owed to the concessionaire. 
Some issues will be theoretically considered here, by analyzing concerns that arises 
from the case and the need to manage this kind of dispute. The issues below are considered in 
order to examine State duties in the oil and gas industry, taking into consideration that it is an 
international industry. 
As set out before, in the Lula case, the denial of the development plan by the ANP 
resulted from the definition of oil field, since the concessions agreement defines “oil field” as 
stated in the Brazilian Petroleum Law and the concept provided in the Brazilian Petroleum 
Law gives certain margin of discretion. However, as already recognized by the ANP, in 
previous cases190 , a precise definition became necessary to provide transparency for the 
contract.  
Although some acts are considered jure imperii, this does not mean they can be 
arbitrary. The definition needs to be clearly established in advance to provide predictability 
for the investor. Brazil needs to strengthen transparent regulation of this subject in order to 
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avoid discussions about legal concepts. Otherwise, the changing of interpretation or the 
failure of the State to provide an unambiguous contract clause can cause damages to private 
parties, which may require some sort of compensation. As explained before, the concept of 
field directly influences the amount of the government take, making it an essential concept 
that must be clearly determined beforehand. 
The failure to clarify technical concepts can even prove to be contrary to good faith, 
since the regulatory agency shall act reasonably and in a prompt and timely manner, based on 
the efficient and economic conduct of petroleum operations and in accordance with good 
international oil industry practices191.  
Another question to be investigated is whether the governmental measure affects the 
investor’s reasonable expectations. The investor must demonstrate that the investment was 
based on circumstances that did not include the challenged regulatory regime and the 
assertion must be objectively reasonable and not based entirely upon the investor’s subjective 
expectations192. 
According to Frederico Favacho, these conflicts must be minimized and resolved by a 
competent conflict management system, whether in a preventive way, as the search for clear 
contracts containing transparent, uniform and unambiguous terms, whether by use of an supra 
state norms, as the principles of UNIDROIT and Lex petrolea and with the adoption of 
arbitration as the best means of solution available to the parties193. 
Traditionally, private international law includes the law of conflict resolution, by 
indicating the conflicting rule. However, soft law arose as an attempt to establish a uniform 
law for substantive rules on certain matters, understood as a complex of rules to justify 
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decisions or to legitimize practices and behaviours typical of a professional nature, in the 
field of international trade194. These rules, although not expressly stated in the agreement 
signed between the parties, identify possible solutions of conflicts in such a way that the 
contracting parties, in anticipation of the expected result, can previously settle the conflict, 
preventing wear and higher costs195. 
 
8.2. Considering the existence of a lex petrolea 
 
The term 'lex petrolea' entered the legal lexicon and the international oil and gas 
industry more than a quarter of a century ago. The term first emerged in a landmark 
international arbitration case in 1982, which concluded in favor of the existence of a 
"customary rule valid for the oil industry - a lex petrolea that was in some sort a particular 
branch of a general universal lex mercatoria."196. Tim Martin wrote that: 
This analysis supports the thesis that a lex petrolea has developed over the 
years, but widens the scope of inquiry to the full range of disputes 
encountered in the international arbitration and court cases. However, it has 
also developed in a number of other forums, from government’s petroleum 
legislation and contracts to the industry’s business practices, which are found 
in its model contracts197.  
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Lex petrolea is most often established from decisions arising from disputes within the 
international oil and gas sector, as this is where the contracts, legislation and treaties that 
affect the petroleum sector are tested and interpreted198. Unlike the courts, the world of 
international arbitration is not bound by precedent, although arbitrators make their decisions 
in a context. Since counsel use precedents in arguing their cases and arbitrators refer to 
precedents in writing their awards, a lex petrolea has developed accordingly.199 
Although the decisions do not have a unity of opinion in the international community 
as to create anything like blackletter law rules, immense progress has been made in the past 
25 years, so that in some petroleum issues, clear legal rules have evolved, while in others at 
least the proper range of rules has been identified. The beginnings of a lex petrolea serve to 
instruct, and in a certain sense even regulate, the international petroleum industry200. Then, 
even when a arbitration agreement chooses to apply the national law in substantive matters, 
the principles  already constructed by lex petrolea shall be considered. 
 
8.3. Pursuing stability 
 
Legal arrangements are important to protect investors entitlements and to ensure 
stability of the regulatory framework governing their activities, since investor is vulnerable to 
host government action that may undermine the financial viability or even expropriate the 
investor’s assets altogether201. 
                                                          
198 Ibid 96. 
199 King (n 196). 95. 
200 Albert Jan Van den Berg, Yearbook Commercial Arbitration 1994 Vol. XIX Vol. XIX (Kluwer Law International 
1994). 





Stabilization clauses aim to stabilize the terms and conditions of an investment project, 
thereby contributing to the management of non-commercial risk. They involve a commitment 
by the host government not to alter the regulatory framework governing the project, by 
legislation or any other means, outside specified circumstances202. More recent stabilization 
clauses have evolved into various and sophisticated tools to manage non-commercial risk 
associated with the investment project203 
Stabilization clauses are particularly common in large natural resource, energy and 
infrastructure projects, where high fixed costs demand huge capital outlays in the early stages 
of the project and long timeframes are necessary to reach the breakeven point204. More recent 
stabilization clauses have evolved into diverse and sophisticated tools to administer non-
commercial risk associated with investment projects. Their scope has tended to broaden, to 
include stabilization of specific aspects of the project, such as its fiscal regime and other 
broad commitments to stabilize the regulatory framework governing the investment205. 
Economic equilibrium clauses are another type of stabilization mechanism, which link 
changes of the terms of the contract to renegotiation to restore its original economic 
equilibrium or payment of compensation. Unlike freezing clauses, economic equilibrium 
clauses stabilize the economic equilibrium of the contract rather than the regulatory 
framework itself. Therefore, regulatory changes are possible as long as the economic balance 
is restored206. 
Economic equilibrium clauses protect against less intrusive forms of government 
action that affect the cost–benefit equilibrium of the investment, which includes legislation, 
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the judicial or administrative interpretation of existing provisions, and other measures that 
influence the economic balance and would prompt some  sort of compensation207. 
In addition, the legal value of stabilization clauses may be reinforced by provisions in 
investment treaties, whereby a State commits itself to honour contractual undertakings of 
nationals of another state party (“umbrella clause”) 208. Indeed, the very nature of this kind of 
investor-State dispute resolution system is a limitation of State sovereignty, as the host 
government sacrifices some freedom of action in exchange for increased flows of foreign 
direct investment209. 
Unfortunately, Brazil is not signatory to any investment treaty that protects foreign 
investors and provides broader coverage than an investment agreement210 . Nevertheless, 
foreign companies can participate in Brazilian bidding rounds, and acquire the right to 
explore and produce oil and gas in the tendered areas. The Brazilian Petroleum Law also 
states that “attracting investments in energy production” and “promoting the growth of the 
country's competitiveness in the international market”, as objectives of the “national policies 
for the rational utilization of the energy sources”211.  
The contract may also require the parties to perform it consistently in good faith, since 
this duty is itself a general principle of law as well as a basis for a prohibition of unjust 
enrichment and of the rule that a State entity cannot rely upon a change of law to excuse a 
breach of contract. It can act as a way of bringing international law principles, based upon 
reason and the practice of civilized countries212. 
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When applying the principle of fair and equitable treatment, tribunals consider other 
principles such as the protection of legitimate investor expectations with respect to the 
maintenance of a stable and predictable legal environment by the host government, the 
principle of transparency, good faith, due process, proportionality and the prohibition on 
arbitrariness213. Not only tribunals, but also courts and authorities of the host State must 
observe prohibition of arbitrariness and requirements of transparency, which fall under the 
general framework of due process214. 
Therefore, State activities related to the oil and gas industry in Brazil should offer 
guarantees to investors and pursue a stable scenario for investments, both national and 
international ones, such since these principles of protection are already instituted in 




Important issues were discussed related to jurisdiction, applicable law and 
arbitrability, in order to clarify the functioning of arbitration. For matters related to 
arbitrability and public policy, the main difficulty arises in cases where the State presents a 
public policy argument as an objection against jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals, by saying the 
right is not disposable. The BAA contains important exceptions to enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, similar to the grounds for non-enforcement of arbitration agreements. In 
particular, Brazilian courts are authorized to refuse recognition and enforcement to any award 
that violates Brazilian sovereignty, public morals, or policy215. 
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Regarding exploration and production of oil and other natural resources, the major 
issues involving the State and investors took into consideration the issues that arose in the 
Lula case. Although some regulatory acts have sovereign nature, the oil and gas industry is an 
international one, and some international standards need to be considered in order to protect 
investors and guarantee a predictable and level playing field. 
Because the investor does not have the benefit of Article 26 of the Washington 
Convention, which established the ICSID, it may be difficult to compel Brazil to participate 
in arbitration proceedings and to keep the government from suing the investor on the same 
dispute in Brazilian courts216. It is still unpredictable how Brazilian courts will deal with 
arbitrations involving the State, especially agencies of the direct administration, considering 
the issues of politics and national sovereignty involved, although as explained in chapter 7.2, 
there is a conflict of competence case pending decision by the STJ that will serve as a guide 
to decide cases similar cases.  
It is necessary to provide a proper environment for investment and to balance public 
and private interests. State’s concerns with collecting higher revenues cannot override the 
security of investors. The main concerns and challenges are improving legislation and 
contracts and giving effectiveness to arbitration clauses, through judicial and administrative 
measures.  
To conclude, it is worth citing Mauricio Gomn, a student in the LL.M. course at 
Queen Mary and Westfield College (University of London). He told that in his personal 
presentation on his first day of class (12 October 1992), Professor Julian D.M. Lew kindly 
asked him, “Are you sure you are in the right classroom?”, surprised that the School of 






International Commercial Arbitration was receiving a Brazilian student for the first time. The 
professor asked: “Is this a sign that things are changing in Brazil? 217” 
The answer is yes, many things have changed in Brazil since then. In 1992, the year 
that Mauricio attended Queen Mary and Westfield College, exploration and production of oil 
and gas were still a State monopoly, exercised exclusively by Petrobras. In 1997, the 
Brazilian Petroleum Law ended the monopoly, enabling the participation of foreign 
companies in biddings of the tendered areas, and created the ANP. The first concession 
agreement was signed before the so-called Round Zero, in 1997, and since then the standard 
contract has contained an arbitration clause218, maintained in all the following bidding rounds 
until now. Due to all these changes, in 2015 many Brazilian students could attend arbitration 
classes at Queen Mary University, not only Commercial Arbitration classes, but also Energy 
Arbitration ones. Nevertheless, 23 years later, we still have many doubts about the way 
changes have been and should be applied in Brazil. 
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